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Abstract. We propose two new axioms of demand responsiveness
for additive cost sharing with variable demands. Group Monotonicity requires
that if a group of agents increase their demands, not all of them pay less. Sol-
idarity says that if agent i demands more, j should not pay more if k pays
less. Both axioms are compatible in the partial responsibility theory postu-
lating Strong Ranking, i.e., the ranking of cost shares should never contradict
that of demands. The combination of Strong Ranking , Solidarity and Mono-
tonicity characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, under which cost shares
are proportional to ‘rescaled’ demands.
The alternativefull responsibility theory isbased on Separability, ruling out
cross-subsidization when costs are additively separable. Neither the Aumann-
Shapley nor the Shapley-Shubik method is group monotonic. On the other
hand, convex combinationsof“nearby”…xed-pathmethodsaregroup-monotonic:
the subsidy-free serial method is the main example. No separable method
meets Solidarity, yet restricting the axiom to submodular (or supermodular)
cost functions leads to a characterization of the …xed-‡ow methods, containing
the Shapley-Shubik and serial methods.
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1. Introduction
The traditional model of cooperative games is well suited to discuss cost-sharing
problems where the demands of the participating agents are …xed (inelastic). Shapley
(1953) and Weber (1988) showed how the simple axioms of Additivity (with respect
to cost) and Dummy (an agent with zero marginal cost pays nothing) determine
individual cost shares as a …xed average of marginal costs.
Following Aumann and Shapley’s (1974) seminal contribution, the additive theory
of cost sharing was extended to variable individual demands: agents i = 1;:::;n want
a quantity xi of good i; and the problem is to split the total cost C(x1;:::;xn) using
no other information than the cost function C: Applications range from the pricing of
utilities such as water, phone or electricity, where the level of individual consumption
a¤ects total cost, tothe sharingof waiting time at a congested server (Shenker (1995),
Haviv (2001)), and the division of highway construction costs between taxpayers (Lee
(2002)).
A simple requirement of demand responsiveness has played a key role in the recent
literature on axiomatic cost sharing. Monotonicity, introduced in Moulin (1995) and
developed in Friedman and Moulin (1999), stipulates that every user’s cost share
should be nondecreasing in her own demand. On the normative side, it expresses
a weak form of responsibility for one’s own demand. If goods are freely disposable,
Monotonicity also has a positive interpretation: it prevents manipulation by arti…cial
(and wasteful) increases of individual demands.
In this paper we propose a handful of new demand responsiveness axioms, some
of them strengthening Monotonicity, and explore their impact in the additive theory
of cost sharing. Our model and our three main axioms are presented in Section 2.
We have a …nite number of users, individual demands are non negative integers, and
the cost function is non decreasing, zero for zero demands, and otherwise arbitrary.
We always assume that individual cost shares are non negative and depend additively
upon the cost function.
Group Monotonicity requires that if a group of agents simultaneously increase
their demands, not all of them pay less. Under the same premises, Strong Group
Monotonicity states that the total cost share allocated to the group should not de-
crease. Bothproperties have dual normative/positive interpretations similar tothose
of Monotonicity. If side-payments are not feasible, Group Monotonicity is su¢cient
to prevent manipulations by a coordinated arti…cial increase of demands; if they are
feasible, we need the latter, stronger property.
Our third main axiom is Solidarity. It requires that a demand change by one
agent a¤ects the share of all other agents in the same direction: no one pays more if
someone pays less. The recent literature on fair division explores the Solidarity idea
in a number of allocation problems (Thomson (1999), Sprumont and Zhou (1999)),On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 3
but this is its …rst application to cost sharing.
A natural family of methods meeting all demand responsiveness properties above
are the quasi-proportional methods computing i0s cost share as
s(xi) P
s(xj)C(x); where
s is is an arbitrary nondecreasing “scaling function”. These simple and familiar
methods only take the actual cost into account, anddivide it in proportionto rescaled
individual demands. Theorem 1 in Section 3 characterizes this family by combining
Solidarity, Monotonicity, and one more axiom called Strong Ranking. The latter
requires cost shares to be ranked in the same order as the corresponding demands,
for any cost function, symmetric or not.
Strong Ranking is the de…ning axiom of the “partial responsibility” theory of
cost sharing (Moulin and Sprumont (2002)). Agents, while responsible for their de-
mands, are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function. This justi…es
some cross-subsidization. We submit that this viewpoint inspires cost sharing rules
for many publicly provided services: disabled customers are not charged more for
transportation services, the same stamp buys delivery of mail to central or remote
areas, and so on.
The alternative view that agents are responsible for cost asymmetries is the basis
of the more familiar “full responsibility” theory. This view leads to the principle of
no cross subsidization pervading the natural monopoly literature (Baumol, Panzar
and Willig (1982), Sharkey (1982)), and to the related Dummy axiom in the model of
cooperative games. In our setting the relevant formulation is the Separability axiom:
if the cost function is additively separable (C(z) =
P
ici(zi) for all z), each agent
should pay her stand-alone cost ci(xi).
The impact of our demand responsiveness conditions under full responsibility is
thesubject of Sections 4 and5. Proposition 2states that neither Solidarity nor Strong
GroupMonotonicity is compatiblewithSeparability. On the other handGroupMono-
tonicity is a very demanding yet achievable property. The simple method charging
incremental costs according to a …xed ordering of the users is an example. More gen-
erally, a …xed-path method charging incremental costs according to a …xed ordering
of the di¤erent units of demand, is group-monotonic. However Group Monotonicity
is typically not preserved by convex combinations of cost sharing methods. For in-
stancethe Shapley-Shubik method (Shubik (1962)), applying theShapley value tothe
stand-alone cooperative game at the given demand pro…le, is not group-monotonic.
Thus this property yields a powerful critique of both the oldest cost-sharing method
in the literature, and of the most popular one, the Aumann-Shapley method (the
latter violates even Monotonicity).
Proposition 3 in Section 4 is an important positive result, allowing us to construct
“reasonable” group-monotonic methods in the full responsibility approach. Any con-
vex combination of “nearby” …xed-path methods is group-monotonic as well. TheOn Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 4
most natural method constructed in this fashion is the subsidy-free serial method
(Moulin (1995)), adapting serial cost sharing to our discrete model.
If Solidarity is out of reach in the full responsibility theory, a weaker version of
this property is feasible when the cost function is submodular. In that case an in-
crease in user i0s demand is a positive externality on other users, and our Submodular
Solidarity axiom in Section 5 rules out changes of opposite signs in their cost shares.
We introduce the rich family of …xed-‡ow methods, corresponding to convex combi-
nations of …xed-path methods, and containing for instance the Shapley-Shubik and
subsidy-free serial methods. Theorem 2 characterizes this family by the combination
of Separability, Monotonicity, and Submodular Solidarity.
Section 6 compares our results under partial and full responsibility. While the
quasi-proportional methods satisfy Solidarity, the cross e¤ects of a demand shift may
not have the expectedsign. For instance, if C is supermodular and xi increases, agent
j’s cost share,
s(xj) P
s(xk)C(x); may go down. We introduce the Positive Externalities
and Negative Externalities axioms: if agent i’s demand raises, all agents j other than
i bene…t when costs are submodular, and su¤er when costs are supermodular. We
show in Proposition 4 that these properties are essentially incompatible with partial
responsibility: no cost-sharing method satis…es Strong Ranking and Positive Exter-
nalities, and the only method satisfying Additivity, Strong Ranking and Negative
Externalities divides costs equally no matter what. By contrast, the axioms are easy
to meet under full responsibility: the …xed-‡ow methods as well as the Aumann-
Shapley method satisfy Positive and Negative Externalities (Proposition 5).
Section 7 takes a second look at the partial responsibility theory. Moulin and
Sprumont (2002) introduce Weak Separability, ruling out cross-subsidization when
it is not implied by Strong Ranking, namely when the cost function takes the form
C(z) =
P
ic(zi). While the quasi-proportional methods violate Weak Separability,
the axiom is compatible with partial responsibility, i.e., with Strong Ranking. The
simplest example is the cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont (1998)). This
method is also group-monotonic (Proposition 6). Yet Strong Group Monotonicity is
incompatiblewith the combinationof Weak Separability andStrongRanking(Propo-
sition 7).
2. The model and the demand responsiveness axioms
Each agent i 2 N = f1;:::;ng demands an integer quantity xi 2 N = f0;1; :::g
of a personalized good. The cost of meeting the demand pro…le x 2 NN must be
split among the members of N: A cost function is a mapping C : NN ! R+ that is
nondecreasing and satis…es C(0) = 0; the set of such mappings is denoted C. A (cost-
sharing) method ’ assigns to each problem (C;x) 2 C£NN a vector of nonnegative
costshares ’(C;x) 2 RN
+ suchthat
P
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method at x:
We use the following notation. Vector inequalities are written ·;<;¿. For any
x;x0 2 NN; [x;x0] = fz 2 NN j x · z · x0g, [x;x0[= [x;x0]nfx0g; ]x;x0] and ]x;x0[ are
de…ned similarly. We let N(x) = fi 2 N j xi > 0g and write n(x) = jN(x)j: For any
S µ N, we denote by xS 2 NS the restriction of x to S and we write x(S) =
P
i2Sxi:
We de…ne eS 2 NN by eS
i = 1 if i 2 S and 0 otherwise. We sometimes write i for
fig; ij for fi;jg; and ¡S for NnS: If i 2 N and C 2 C, we de…ne @iC : NN ! R+ by
@iC(z) = C(z + ei) ¡ C(z): Finally, we let ¢ = fy 2 RN
+ j
P
i2N yi = 1g:
The requirement that cost shares be nonnegative is part of our de…nition of a
method. Nonnegativity is a minimal form of demand responsiveness. It does rule out
well-known procedures such as equal split beyond stand-alone costs,







and the marginal cost procedure







where @iC(x ¡ei) is de…ned to be zero if xi = 0:
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to additive methods.
Additivity. For any C;C0 2 C and x 2 NN; ’(C +C0;x) = ’(C;x) +’(C0;x):
This powerful mathematical property is devoid of ethical content. Additive cost-
sharing methods are very convenient in practice. When production can be decom-
posed into the sum of several independent processes (like research, production and
marketing; or construction and maintenance), applying the method to each subpro-
cess and adding the resulting cost shares is equivalent to applying the method to the
consolidated cost function. The proper level of application of the method is not a
matter of dispute.
We nowde…ne four demandresponsiveness conditions. The …rst one is the familiar
Monotonicity (Moulin (1995)) requiring individual cost shares to be monotonic in the
corresponding demands.
Monotonicity. For all C 2 C; x;x0 2 NN; and i 2 N, fxi < x0
i and xj = x0
j for all
j 2 Nnfigg ) f’i(C;x) · ’i(C;x0)g:
When communication between agents is easy, demand coordination is a concern.
We propose a group version of Monotonicity requiring that, when several agents
increase simultaneously their demands, not all of them pay less.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 6
Group Monotonicity. For any C 2 C, any x;x0 2 NN; and any nonempty S µ N;
fxi < x0
i for all i 2 S and xi = x0
i for all i 2 NnSg ) f’i(C;x) · ’i(C;x0) for at
least one i 2 Sg:
A natural strengthening of Group Monotonicity evaluates the impact of demand
increases followed by side-payments. When money transfers between agents are fea-
sible, John may be willing to strategically raise his demand if the corresponding drop
in some other agents’ shares more than compensates the increase in John’s share.
Strong Group Monotonicity prevents such manipulations.
Strong Group Monotonicity. For any C 2 C; x;x0 2 NN; any nonempty S µ
N and i 2 S; fxi < x0
i and xj = x0
j for all j 2 Nnfigg ) f
P
j2S ’j(C;x) · P
j2S ’j(C;x0)g:
Clearly Strong Group Monotonicity also rules out the pro…tability ofa coordinated
increase by several members of S followed by side-payments within S:
Our last demand responsiveness axiom requires thatall members of agroup should
be treated similarly whenever a demand change occurs outside the group.
Solidarity. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any x;x0 2 NN; fxj = x0
j for all
j 2 Nnfigg ) f’j(C;x) · ’j(C;x0) for all j 2 Nnfig, or ’j(C;x) ¸ ’j(C;x0) for all
j 2 Nnfigg:
We conclude this section by noting the following connection between our axioms.
Proposition 1. Every cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Solidarity, and
Monotonicity satis…es Strong Group Monotonicity.
Proof. The subset D = fC 2 C j C(z) 2 f0;1g for all z 2 NNg of cost functions
taking the values 0 or 1 plays a central role in this and several subsequent proofs, in
particular that of Theorem 1*. Every C 2 C is a nonnegative linear combination of
cost functions in D. Thus an additive method ’ meets Strong Group Monotonicity






’j(C;x+ ei) for all S µ N and all i 2 S: (1)
If C(x) = 0; (1) is automatically satis…ed. If C(x) = 1, then C(x+ei) = 1 and (1) is
equivalent to
’j(C;x + ei) · ’j(C;x) for all distinct i;j 2 N;
which is clearly implied by the combination of Solidarity and Monotonicity.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 7
3. Demand responsiveness and partial responsibility: the
quasi-proportional methods
This section is devoted to the quasi-proportional methods discussed in the Introduc-
tion.
De…nition 1. A method ’ is quasi-proportional if ’i(C;x) =
s(xi) P
j2N s(xj) C(x) for all
i;C; and x; where s : N ! R+ is nondecreasing and s(1) > 0 (with the convention
that ’(C;0) = 0). Examples include the egalitarian method ’i(C;x) = 1
nC(x) and
the proportional method ’i(C;x) = xi
x(N)C(x):
These methods meet Additivity, Monotonicity, and Solidarity, hence, by Propo-
sition 1, satisfy all the demand responsiveness axioms of Section 2. No information
about “counter-factual” costs is used in computing the cost shares, which are there-
fore completely insensitive to the asymmetries in the cost structure. In particular,
agents who ask more pay more, regardless of the cost function.
Strong Ranking. For all C 2 C, x 2 NN; and i;j 2 N; fxi · xjg ) f’i(C;x) ·
’j(C;x)g:
This de…nes the “partial responsibility” theory of cost sharing in which agents are
held responsible for the size of their own demand but not for the idiosyncrasies of the
cost function. Note that the egalitarian method barely satis…es Strong Ranking: it
violates the strict version requiringthat the ranking ofcost shares be identical tothat
of demands when the cost function is strictly monotonic. The proportional method
is more responsive to demands; its simplicity makes it very popular in practice.
We now show that Additivity, Solidarity, Monotonicity and Strong Ranking es-
sentially characterize the quasi-proportional methods. The precise statement requires
a couple of additional de…nitions. Notice …rst that the egalitarian method possesses
a property slightly stronger than Solidarity,
Strict Solidarity. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any x;x0 2 NN; fxj = x0
j for all
j 2 Nnfigg ) f i) ’j(C;x) < ’j(C;x0) for all j 2 Nnfig or ii) ’j(C;x) = ’j(C;x0)
for all j 2 Nnfig or iii) ’j(C;x) > ’j(C;x0) for all j 2 Nnfigg;
whichthe proportional method fails because agents demanding zero are never a¤ected
by changes in others’ demands.
On the other hand, the proportional method meets
Zero Cost for Zero Demand. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any x 2 NN;
fxi = 0g ) f’i(C;x) = 0g;
which the egalitarian method obviously fails. This axiom is compelling if agents are
not responsible for the demands of others1.
1While automatically satis…ed in the more familiar “full responsibility” theory (where it followsOn Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 8
Finally, we observe that both the egalitarian and the proportional method meet
Positive Cost for Positive Demand. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any x 2 NN;
fxi > 0 and C(x) > 0g ) f’i(C;x) > 0g;
which is a strong but simple interpretation of responsibility for one’s demand2. We
are now ready to state our …rst main result.
Theorem 1.
i) Assume n ¸ 4: A cost-sharing method ’ satis…es Additivity, Strong Ranking,
Strict Solidarity, and Monotonicity if and only if there existsa nondecreasing function






for all C 2 C; i 2 N; and x 2 NN:
ii) Assume n ¸ 3: A cost-sharing method ’ satis…es Additivity, Strong Ranking,
Solidarity, Monotonicity, Zero Cost for Zero Demand and Positive Cost for Positive
Demand if and only if there exists a nondecreasing function s : N ! R such that
s(0) = 0; s(1) > 0; and (2) holds for all C 2 C; i 2 N; and x 2 NN (with the
convention ’(C;0) = 0).
Choosing a positive constant a and setting s(t) = t + a for all t; equation (2)
de…nes a hybrid method approaching the egalitarian method when a ! 1 and the
proportional one when a ! 0: Any such method meets Strict Solidarity.
Four observations are in order.
(1) Theorem 1 is a corollary to Theorem 1* and Lemma 2, stated and proved in
the Appendix, which dispense with Strong Ranking. Dropping Strong Ranking allows
for a family including more complicated methods, of which two interesting subclasses
are easily described.
Consider …rst the methods ’(C;x) = ￿(x)C(x); where ￿(x) is an arbitrary map-
ping from NNnf0g to ¢. We call such methods simple: they completely ignore the
shape of the cost function and reduce the cost-sharing problem to a “general claim
arbitration” problem (where the amount to be divided may exceed or fall short of the
sum of the claims) as in Herrero, Maschler and Villar (1999) and Naumova (2002).
from Additivity and Separability: see Section 4), Zero Cost for Zero Demand must be explicitly
required in the partial responsibility theory.
2This axiom is incompatible with the main axiom of the full responsibility theory, Separability,
because a dummy agent pays nothing even if his demand is positive. By contrast, Positive Cost for
Positive Demand is easily met in the partial responsibility approach.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 9
It follows from the proof of Theorem 1* that a simple method meets Additivity, Soli-







for all i 2 N; where si : N ! R+ is nondecreasing and si(1) > 0:













for all i;C; and x; where ‚ 2 [0;1]. For ‚ = 0; this is just the egalitarian method.
Setting ‚ = n¡1 yields “equal split beyond stand-alone costs” introduced in Section
2, which however does not guarantee nonnegative cost shares. The nonnegativity
constraints force ‚ between 0 and 1: These methods split equally the balance above a
fraction ofstand-alone costs. Theentire family ofmethods meetingAdditivity, Mono-
tonicity and Solidarity combines features of these methods and the quasi-proportional
methods: see the Appendix for details.
(2) Replacing the combination of Solidarity and Monotonicity by Strong Group
Monotonicity (which is implied: recall Proposition 1) allows for many more methods.
For instance, the simple methods ’(C;x) = ￿(x)C(x) satisfy Strong Group Mono-
tonicity if and only if ￿i is non-increasing in xj for any two distinct i;j (which is
much less restrictive than the asymmetric quasi-proportional form (3)) and Strong
Ranking if and only if ￿i(x) · ￿j(x) , xi · xj for any i;j and x. Characterizing the
entire class of methods meeting Additivity, Strong Group Monotonicity and Strong
Ranking is a challenging open problem.
(3) All methods in Theorem 1 satisfy a requirement stronger than Solidarity.
When an arbitrary subset of agents change their demands, the impact on the cost
shares of the others goes in the same direction: for any C 2 C; any S µ N; and any
x;x0 2 NN; fxj = x0
j for all j 2 NnSg ) f’j(C;x) · ’j(C;x0) for all j 2 NnS or
’j(C;x) ¸ ’j(C;x0) for all j 2 NnSg:
(4) The egalitarian method occupies a special place within the quasi-proportional
methods, because it meets a much stronger version of the Solidarity axiom:
Full Solidarity. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any x;x0 2 NN; fxi < x0
i and
xj = x0
j for all j 2 Nnfigg ) f’(C;x) · ’(C;x0)g.
This axiom strengthens both Solidarity and Monotonicity. It characterizes the
…xed-proportions methods: a cost-sharing method ’ satis…es Additivity and Full Sol-On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 10
idarity if and only if there exists ‚ 2 ¢ such that ’(C;x) = C(x)‚ for all C 2 C and
x 2 NN: We omit the easy proof3.
4. Demand Responsiveness and full responsibility
We turn to demand responsiveness properties within the familiar “full responsibility”
approach, where agents areresponsiblefor theidiosyncrasies ofthe costfunction. The
de…ning axiom says that everyone should pay the cost of their own demand whenever
that cost does not depend on others agents’ demands.
Separability. For all C 2 C; x 2 NN; fC(z) =
P
i2N ci(zi) for all z 2 NN; where
ci(0) = 0 for all ig ) f’i(C;x) = ci(xi) for all i 2 Ng:
All quasi-proportional methods violate Separability. More fundamentally, the
axiom is incompatible withStrongRankingeveninthe absenceofAdditivity. Suppose
costs are additively separable (C(z) =
P
ci(xi)) and i’s stand-alone cost exceeds j’s
at all levels (ci(t) > cj(t) for all t > 0). If xi = xj; Strong Ranking imposes equal
cost shares for i and j while Separability requires that i pays more than j.
Under Additivity, Separability is equivalent to the more familiar Dummy axiom
requiring that dummy agents pay nothing: for all C 2 C; x 2 NN; and i 2 N,
f@iC = 0g ) f’i(C;x) = 0g4:
The combination of Additivity and Separability is well understood. Moulin and
Vohra (2003) o¤er a representation in terms of ‡ows. A conservative unit ‡ow - or
simply, a‡ow- toa demandpro…lex 2 NN is a mappingf(:;x) : [0;x[! RN
+ satisfying
the convention that fi(z;x) = 0 whenever zi = xi; the normalization
P
i2N fi(0;x) =




i2N(z)fi(z ¡ ei;x) for all z 2
]0;x[: Note that this implies
P
i2N(x)fi(x¡ ei;x) = 1.
Lemma 1 (Moulin and Vohra (2003)). A method ’ satis…es Additivity and Sepa-
rability if and only if, for every x 2 NN, there is a (necessarily unique) ‡ow f(:;x)





for all C 2 C and all i 2 N; we call f the ‡ow representation of ’:
An important consequence of this representation is the following property.
Independence of Irrelevant Costs. For all x 2 NN and C1;C2 2 C, fC1(z) =
C2(z) for all z 2 [0;x]g ) f’(C1;x) = ’(C2;x)g:
3Note that if D 2 D and D(x) = 1; Full Solidarity implies ’(D;x) = ’(D;x + ei) for all i. This
implies …rst that ’(–
x;x) is independent of x; then ’(D;x) is independent of both D and x:
4See Moulin and Vohra (2003), Corollary 3, and notice that under Additivity, their Non-Dummy
axiom is equivalent to Separability.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 11
The simplest separable additivemethods correspondto ‡ows f(:;x) mapping [0;x[
into f0;1gN: In this case the entire ‡ow runs along a monotone path from 0 to x
in the integer grid. Fix such a path. At each step of the path, the coordinate of
exactly one agent increases by one. Charging to this agent the corresponding cost
increase and summing over the entire path de…nes a cost-sharing method at the
demand pro…le x: Formally, any sequence of agents … : f1;:::;x(N)g ! N such that
j…¡1(i)j = xi for each i 2 N, de…nes a monotone path z… to x by setting z…(0) = 0
and z…(t) = z…(t¡1)+e…(t) for t = 1;:::;x(N): This path, in turn, generates the ‡ow
fi(z;x) = 1 if for some t, z…(t ¡ 1) = z; z…(t) = z + ei; and fi(z;x) = 0 otherwise.






for all i 2 N and C 2 C. If, for every demand pro…le x; ’(:;x) is generated by a
monotone path to x; we say that ’ is path-generated. Wang (1999) shows that a
method satis…es Additivity and Separability if and only if it is the pointwise limit of
convex combinations of path-generated methods. Note that if we restrict attention to
a bounded subset of demand pro…les, the two axioms characterize simply the (…xed)
convex combinations of path-generated methods.
Example 1. The Aumann-Shapley5 method ’as solves every problem (C;x) by
averaging the cost-share vectors ’…(C;x) generated along all paths … to x. In the
corresponding ‡ow representation, fas
i (z;x) equals the proportion of paths to x which




for all i 2 N and z 2 [0;x¡ ei]; where ﬁ(z) = z(N)!=
Q
j2N zj!.
Example 2. The Shapley-Shubik method ’ss (Shubik (1962)) averages the cost
shares computed along the paths that follow the edges of the cube [0;x[: Letting




n(x)! if z;z + ei 2 Ei(x) and fss
i (z;x) = 0 otherwise,
where n(z;x) = jfj 2 N j zj < xjgj:
Example 3. The subsidy-free serial method ’sf(Moulin (1995)) averages the cost
shares computed along the paths that follow the “constrained diagonal” to x. Let
G(x) = fz 2 [0;x[j 8i;j 2 N;(xi · xj) ) (jzi ¡ zjj · 1 or zi = xi < zj)g and
G¤(x) = fz 2 [0;x[j 8i;j 2 N;(xi · xj) ) (zi ¡ zj = 0 or zi = xi < zj)g: For
each z 2 G(x); denote by z(x) the smallest z¤ 2 G¤(x) such that z¤ > z and let
z(x) be the largest z¤ 2 G¤(x) such that z¤ · z. The ‡ow fsf(:;x) associated with
5The original de…nition and characterizations of this method are in the model with continuous
demands: Billera and Heath (1982), Mirman and Tauman (1982). We present here its counterpart
in the discrete model. For an axiomatization of[this discrete version, see Sprumont (2004).On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 12
the serial method ’sf(:;x) at x is given by f
sf
i (z;x) = fss
i (z ¡ z(x);z(x) ¡ z(x)) if
z;z + ei 2 G(x) and f
sf
i (z;x) = 0 otherwise.
We are now ready to describe the consequences of our four demand responsiveness
conditions under full responsibility. First, we note that the two strongest conditions
are incompatible with Additivity and Separability.
Proposition 2. Suppose n ¸ 3: Then
i) no cost-sharing method satis…es Additivity, Separability, and Solidarity;
ii) no cost-sharing method satis…es Additivity, Separability, and Strong Group Mono-
tonicity.
Proof. Statement i) We establish the incompatibility for n = 3; the extension to
n ¸ 3 follows immediately by consideringcost functions where all but threeagents are
dummies. Let ’ satisfy the three stated axioms and let f be its ‡ow representation
as in formula (5). Let x = e12; x0 = e123: De…ne C1 2 C by C1(z) = 1 if z ¸ e1 or
z ¸ e23; and C1(z) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, de…ne C2 2 C by C2(z) = 1 if z ¸ e2
or z ¸ e13; and C2(z) = 0 otherwise. Note that C1 = D1 on [0;x], where D1 is the
additively separable function D1(z) = 1 if z1 ¸ 1;D1(z) = 0 otherwise. Thus by
Independence of Irrelevant Costs and Separability ’(C1;x) = e1. On the other hand
’2(C1;x0) = f2(e3;x0): A similar argument applied to C2 gives ’(C2;x) = e2 and
’1(C2;x0) = f1(e3;x0):
If ’1(C1;x0) < ’1(C1;x) = 1; Solidarity implies ’2(C1;x0) · ’2(C1;x) = 0; hence
’2(C1;x0) = 0: The latter equality holds as well if ’1(C1;x0) = ’1(C1;x) = 1: Thus
f2(e3;x0) = 0: A similar argument involvingC2 instead of C1 gives f1(e3;x0) = 0: Now
‡ow conservation yields f3(0;x0) = 0: By exchanging the roles of the agents, we get
similarly fi(0;x0) = 0 for i = 1;2; a contradiction to the de…nition of a conservative
unit ‡ow.
Statement ii) The proof mimics that of statement i): the …rst paragraph is un-
changed; then apply Strong Group Monotonicity to C1 (with i = 3 and S = f1;3g)
to get ’2(C1;x0) · ’2(C1;x) = 0; hence f2(e3;x0) = 0; and to C2 (with i = 3 and
S = f2;3g) to get f1(e3;x0) = 0: The rest is unchanged.
By contrast to Proposition 2, Monotonicity and Group Monotonicity are compat-
ible with Additivity and Separability. Both have a lot of bite. As mentioned in the
Introduction, the Aumann-Shapley method is not monotonic6. The Shapley-Shubik
method is monotonic, but not group-monotonic. We only prove the latter statement.
6A simple counterexample has two agents and the cost function –
(1;1)(z) = 1 for all z ¸ (1;1)
and –
(1;1)(z) = 0 otherwise. Then ’as(–
(1;1);(1;1)) = ( 1
2; 1
2) and ’as(–
(1;1);(2;1)) = ( 1
3; 2
3); a
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Let N = f1;2;3g and C be the cost function:
C(z) = 1 if z ¸ (2;0;1) or z ¸ (1;1;1) or z ¸ (0;2;1);
0 otherwise.
Check that ’ss






1 (C;(2;2;1)) = ’ss
2 (C;
(2;2;1)); which contravenes Group Monotonicity.
The characterization of all methods meeting Additivity, Separability and Group
Monotonicity remains an open problem. In the rest of this section, we construct a
fairly rich family of such methods.
We start with the …xed-path methods. Any …xed sequence … : Nnf0g ! N
generates anin…nite …xedpath z… : N ! NN throughthe induction z…(0) = 0; z…(t) =
z…(t¡1)+e…(t) for t 2 Nnf0g: If …¡1(i) is in…nite for each i 2 N; we call the sequence
… unbounded; the corresponding …xed path is unbounded in each coordinate (i.e.,
z…
i (t) = jfs 2 …¡1(i) j s · tgj goes to in…nity as t grows): To any demand pro…le x 2
NN, we associate asequence …x : f1;:::;x(N)g ! N by keeping the …rst xi occurrences
of each i : for instance, if n = 3; x = (1;4;2) and … = 1;2;3;1;2;3;1;2;3;:::; then
…x = 1;2;3;2;3;2;2: The sequence …x in turn generates the monotone path z…x
to x
and the associated cost-sharing method ’…x(:;x) at x via formula (6). The …xed-path
method ’… based on … is de…ned by ’…(:;x) = ’…x(:;x) for all x:
To see why such methods satisfy Group Monotonicity, …x … and x: For each i 2 N
let ti(…;x) be the smallest integer t such that z…
i (t) = xi: Let S µ N and consider a
demand pro…le x0 such that xi < x0
i for all i 2 S and xi = x0
i for all i 2 NnS: Find the
(necessarily unique) agent i0 2 S such that ti0(…;x) · ti(…;x) for all i 2 S: Because
… is a …xed sequence, ’…
i0(C;x0) is computed along a path z…x0
to x0 which coincides




Fixed-path methods are asymmetric. To restore symmetry, we could take con-
vex combinations of such methods, but the example of the Shapley-Shubik method
demonstrates that in general this operation will not preserve Group Monotonicity.
Interestingly, taking convex combinations of “su¢ciently close” …xed-path methods
does preserve Group Monotonicity. Formally, let … be a …xed unbounded sequence
and let i;j 2 N: Construct …ij : Nnf0g ! fi;jg by deleting from … all occurrences
of agents in Nnfi;jg: This sequence generates the projection of z… on Nfi;jg; denoted
z…ij
: Nnf0g ! Nfi;jg; in the usual way. We say that two …xed unbounded sequences







(t+ 1) = z
…fi;jg
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Proposition 3. If f…1;:::;…Kgis a family of unbounded sequences which are pairwise
nearby, and ‚1;:::;‚K are nonnegative numbers summing up to 1, then
PK
k=1‚k’…k
satis…es Additivity, Separability, and Group Monotonicity. In particular, the subsidy-
free serial method (Example 3) satis…es these three axioms.
Proof. By Lemma 1,
PK
k=1‚k’…k meets Additivity and Separability. Tocheck Group
Monotonicity, …x C 2 C, S µ N; and x;x0 2 NN such that xi < x0
i for all i 2 S and
xi = x0
i for all i 2 NnS: Let i1 2 S be the agent in S such that ti1(…1;x) · ti(…1;x)
for all i 2 S: As explained previously, ’
…1
i1 (C;x) · ’
…1
i1 (C;x0):
Next we show that ’
…k
i1 (C;x) · ’
…k
i1 (C;x0) for all k 2 f2;:::;Kg: Fix k and recall
that …k is nearby …1: This implies that for all i2N; either ti1(…k;x) · ti(…k;x) or, if
the opposite strict inequality is true,
ti(…k;x) < s < ti1(…k;x) ) s = 2 …
¡1
k (i):
If i 2 S; the above property implies ti1(…k;x) < ti(…k;x + ei) · ti(…k;x0): It follows
that ti1(…k;x) < ti(…k;x0) for all i 2 S: Therefore ’
…k
i1 (C;x0) is computed along a path




It follows that the subsidy-free serial method meets the three axioms because ’sf
is simply the arithmetic average of the n! methods generated by the …xed unbounded
sequences p(1); p(2);:::; p(n); p(1); p(2);:::; p(n);::: corresponding to the possible
permutations p on N.
Our companion paper, Moulin and Sprumont (2002), o¤ers a characterization
of the subsidy-free serial method based on the property called Distributivity, and
expressing for the composition of cost functions (with perfect substitute outputs) the
same invariance as Additivity does for their addition.
5. The fixed-flow methods
Within the full responsibility theory, we explore now two axioms weakening, respec-
tively, Strong Ranking and Solidarity. Separability is incompatiblewith Strong Rank-
ing but is clearly compatible with the following weaker condition:
Ranking. For all C 2 C, x 2 NN; and i;j 2 N; fC is a symmetric function of all its
variables and xi · xjg ) f’i(C;x) · ’j(C;x)g:
The restriction to symmetric cost functions is very natural: when C is symmetric,
any di¤erence in cost shares must originate in di¤erences in demands, hence the
ranking of cost shares should follow that of individual demands. Examples 1, 2, 3 all
satisfy Ranking.
Next, Separability is incompatible with Solidarity (Proposition 2), but it is con-
sistent with a restricted version of that axiom. Solidarity is very demanding when allOn Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 15
types of production externalities are allowed, thus it is natural to limit its application
to those cases where externalities are clearly signed. For any C 2 C; i;j 2 N; and
z 2 NN; de…ne @ijC(z) = @iC(z + ej) ¡ @iC(z): The subsets of submodular and su-
permodular cost functions, respectively, are Csub = fC 2 C j @ijC · 0 for all distinct
i;j 2 Ng and Csup = fC 2 C j @ijC ¸ 0 for all distinct i;j 2 Ng:
Submodular Solidarity. For any C 2 Csub, any i 2 N; and any x;x0 2 NN; fxj = x0
j
for all j 2 Nnfigg ) f’j(C;x) · ’j(C;x0) for all j 2 Nnfig or ’j(C;x) ¸ ’j(C;x0)
for all j 2 Nnfigg: Supermodular Solidarity is de…ned by replacing Csub with Csup
in the previous statement:
Examples 1, 2, 3 all satisfy the restricted solidarity properties. Combining either
of them with Monotonicity and Separability circumscribes a very natural family of
methods. For any ‡ow f(:;x) on [0;x[ and any x0 2 [0;x]; the projection of f(:;x)
on [0;x0[; denoted px0f(:;x); is de…ned as follows: for any i 2 N and z 2 [0;x0[ write
K = fj 2 N j zj = x0
jg and let






with the convention that the sum is simply fi(z;x) if K = ;: Note that px0f(:;x) is
a ‡ow to x0.
For simplicity, we state our characterization result for bounded cost-sharing prob-
lems: we …x x 2 (Nµ nf0g)N and speak of a cost-sharing method restricted to [0;x] if
x varies in [0;x]. The translation of all our axioms into this framework is straight-
forward: one merely needs to restrict their application to the demand pro…les in
[0;x]:
De…nition 2. A cost-sharing method ’ restricted to [0;x] is a …xed-‡ow method if
there is a ‡ow f(:;x) to x such that, for every x 2 [0;x]; the ‡ow pxf(:;x) represents
’(:;x):
Examples include the…xed-path, Shapley-Shubik, andsubsidy-free serial methods.
One can check directly f(:;x) = pxf(:;x0) for any x;x0;x · x0; or apply our next
result. On the other hand, the Aumann-Shapley method is not a …xed-‡ow method.
The proof of the following result is in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Let x 2 (Nµ nf0g)N. For any cost-sharing method ’ restricted to [0;x];
the following statements are equivalent:
i) ’ is a …xed-‡ow method;
ii) ’ satis…es Additivity, Separability, Monotonicity, and Submodular Solidarity;
iii) ’ satis…es Additivity, Separability, Monotonicity, and Supermodular Solidarity.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 16
We conclude this section with three comments.
1) Theorem 2 is tight. For a method satisfying all axioms but Additivity, let
’i(C;x) =
C(xi;0¡i)+1 P
j2N(C(xj;0¡j)+1)C(x) unless C is additively separable, in which case we
compute cost shares by applying Separability. A method violating only Separabil-
ity is the proportional method ’i(C;x) = xi
x(N)C(x). An example violating only
Monotonicity is the Aumann-Shapley method: we prove in Section 6 that it actually
satis…es properties stronger than Submodular Solidarity and Supermodular Solidar-
ity. Finally, we describe a method violating only the latter two axioms. Let n = 3
and x = (2;2;2): Consider the two monotone paths to x de…ned by the sequences
…1 = 1;2;3;1;2;3;
…2 = 1;2;3;2;1;3:
Let f1, f2 be the ‡ows to x corresponding to …1, …2. For each x 2]0;x]; de…ne the
‡ow f(:;x) to x by f(:;x) = pxf1 if x = (2;2;1); and f(:;x) = pxf2 otherwise. This
generates a method restricted to [0;x] with the desired properties.
2) Fixed ‡ow methods satisfy a stronger property than Dummy, called Strong
Dummy: for all C 2 C, x 2 NN; and i 2 N; f@iC = 0g ) f’i(C;x) = 0 and
’j(C;x) = ’j(C;(0i;x¡i)) for all j 2 Nnig: This follows by applying f(:;x0) =
px0f(:;x) to x0 = (0i;x¡i):However the combination of Additivity, Strong Dummy
and Monotonicity is not enough to characterize the …xed ‡ow methods.
3) Theorem 2 suggests interesting open questions. Many …xed-‡ow methods,
including the Shapley-Shubik and subsidy-free serial methods, meet Ranking. If
n = 2; all …xed-‡ow methods on [0;x] where x1 = x2 and the ‡ow f is symmetric
(f1(z;x) = f2((z2;z1);x) for all z) meet Ranking. Surprisingly, this property does
not generalize to n ¸ 3: Here is an example of a method based on a symmetric ‡ow
to x = x1eN that violates Ranking. Let n = 3; x = (3;3;3); and consider the six
monotone paths to x de…ned by the sequence
1;2;1;2;1;3;2;3;3
and the …ve sequences obtained from it by permuting agents. Let f be the (fully
symmetric) ‡ow on [0;x] obtained by putting an equal weight on these six paths, and
let ’ be the resulting …xed-‡ow method. Consider the cost function
C(z) = 1 if z ¸ z¤ for some z¤ 2 Z¤;
0 otherwise,
where Z¤ = f(1;2;2);(2;1;2);(2;2;1);(3;1;1);(1;3;1);(1;1;3)g: The function C is




diction of Ranking. This raises the problem of determining which …xed-‡ow methods
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Characterizing the class of …xed-‡ow methods meeting Group Monotonicity is
another challenging open problem.
6. Comparing the partial and full responsibility approaches
Under Submodular or Supermodular Solidarity, the impact of an increase in agent i’s
demand on j’s cost share must go in the same direction for all j other than i but this
direction is a priori unrestricted. It is natural to require more: that all j other than
i bene…t when costs are submodular, and su¤er when costs are supermodular.
Positive Externalities. For any C 2 Csub; any i 2 N; and any x;x0 2 NN; fxi < x0
i
and xj = x0
j for all j 2 Nnfigg ) f’j(C;x) ¸ ’j(C;x0) for all j 2 Nnfigg: Negative
Externalities is de…ned by replacing the subset Csub with Csup and the inequality
sign ¸ with · in the previous statement.
All quasi-proportional methods violate Positive Externalities and all but one vi-
olate Negative Externalities. The tension between these two axioms and Strong
Ranking is systematic.
Proposition 4.
i) No cost-sharing method satis…es Strong Ranking and Positive Externalities:
ii) The only cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Strong Ranking and Nega-
tive Externalities is the egalitarian method7.
Proof. i) Consider the cost function C(z) = 0 if z · 2e1, = 1 otherwise. Check it is
submodular (it is a particular case of the function de…ned by (26) in the Appendix):
By nonnegativity of cost shares and Positive Externalities, ’(C;z) = 0 and ’(C;z +
e2) = e2; violating Strong Ranking. Note that Additivity is not invoked.
ii) We focus on the case n = 2 and leave the extension to the reader. Let z 6= 0
and consider the supermodular cost function –
z de…ned by (28) in Step 3 of the proof
of Theorem 2. Let x be an arbitrary demand pro…le. If –
z(x) = 0, the nonnegativity
of cost shares forces ’(–
z;x) = (0;0): If –
z(x) = 1; distinguish three cases. If x1 = x2,















2): A symmetrical argument handles the case x1 > x2: This shows
that ’ is the egalitarian method on the cost functions –z: As every cost function
coincides on every [0;x] with a linear combination of such functions, the claim follows
by Additivity.
By contrast, the …xed-‡ow methods satisfy Positive and Negative Externalities.
Many more separable methods meet these axioms: an important example is the
Aumann-Shapley method. The proof of the following result is in the Appendix.
7Note that Negative Externalities is implied by Full Solidarity and compare the current result
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Proposition 5. The …xed-‡ow methods and the Aumann-Shapley method satisfy
Positive Externalities and Negative Externalities.
To sum up, Strong Ranking is compatible with Solidarity but the direction of the
cross-e¤ects may be counter-intuitive; Separability is consistent with a limited form
of solidarity only but the cross-e¤ects may be guaranteed to have the expected sign.
7. Weak separability
This section takes a second look at the partial responsibility theory. In Moulin and
Sprumont (2002) we argue that a sound theory of partial responsibility should per-
form cross-subsidization to correct for cost asymmetries, and for that purpose only.
Subsidization is not justi…ed when the cost function is symmetric: in such cases, the
separability principle still applies. Thus if the cost function is not only symmetric
but also additively separable, each agent will pay her “own” separable cost:
Weak Separability. For all C 2 C; x 2 NN; fC(z) =
P
i2N c(zi) for all z 2 NNg )
f’i(C;x) = c(xi) for all i 2 Ng:
All quasi-proportional methods violate Weak Separability. For instance, if n = 2;
x1 < x2; and C(z) = c(z1)+ c(z2), the proportional method cross-subsidizes agent 2
at 1’s expense when c is convex, and vice-versa when c is concave.
Yet, Weak Separability is compatible with Strong Ranking. A complete descrip-
tion of the methods meeting Additivity, Weak Separability, and Strong Ranking is
o¤ered in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. A key member of that class is the cross-
subsidizing serial method de…ned in Sprumont (1998)8.
Example 5. For any x 2 NN
¤ = fx 2 NN : x1 · ::: · xng and all i 2 N, de…ne
xi = xieN ^ x. The cross-subsidizing serial method ’cs assigns to every problem
(C;x) 2 C£ NN
¤ the vector of cost shares ’cs(C;x) = 1
nC(x1)eN + 1
n¡1[C(x2) ¡
C(x1)]eNn1 +::: + [C(xn) ¡ C(xn¡1)]en: The cost shares for an arbitrary problem
obtain by applying the formula after reordering the coordinates of the demand pro…le
in nondecreasing order.
Proposition 6. The cross-subsidizing serial method satis…es Strong Ranking, Weak
Separability, and Group Monotonicity. It fails Solidarity and Strong Group Mono-
tonicity.
We omit the easy proof of these two statements. The violation of Strong Group
Monotonicity isa consequenceof ageneral incompatibility recordedin the nextpropo-
sition; see the Appendix for a proof.
8See Moulin and Sprumont (2002) for a characterization based on the Distributivity axiom men-
tioned at the end of Section 4.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 19
Proposition 7. If n ¸ 3; no cost-sharing method satis…es Additivity, Strong Rank-
ing, Weak Separability, and Strong Group Monotonicity.
We conjecture that a similar incompatibility holds when Strong Group Mono-
tonicity is replaced with Solidarity.
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8. Appendix
8.1. Shared-‡ow representation of additive methods. De…ne a sharing rule
for x 2 NN to be a mapping s(:;:;x) : [0;x[£N ! ¢: The vector r(z;j;x) speci…es
how the ‡ow fj(z;x) between z and z +ej is shared among the agents. Choosing for







for all C 2 C de…nes an additive cost-sharing method. Keep in mind that r is vector-
valued while @jC and fj are scalar-valued.
Conversely, Moulin and Vohra (2003) show that all additive methods possess at
least one such shared-‡ow representation (f;r): Observe that these methods meet
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8.2. Statement and proof of Theorem 1*. Theorem 1* and Lemma 2 below
constitute a more general characterization result than Theorem 1, in which we drop
the Strong Ranking assumption. Denote by R+ and R++ the sets of nonnegative
and strictly positive real numbers, respectively. For each i 2 N; choose a function
si : N ! R+ such that si(xi) > 0 whenever xi > 0: If x > 0; write Fi(x) =
si(xi) P
N sj(xj)
and F(x) = (F1(x);:::;Fn(x)) Next, choose a function „i assigning a real number
to every pair (xi;ti) 2 (Nnf0g)2 such that ti · xi: For every cost-sharing problem







which may be viewed as a generalized stand-alone cost for agent i: The formula
’
s;„






de…nes an additive cost-sharing method provided cost shares are always nonnegative.
Setting ﬁ+
j (xj) = maxf0;„j(xj;tj) j tj 2 [1;xj]g and ﬁ¡
j (xj) = minf0;„j(xj;tj) j tj 2






j (xj))+ (1¡ Fi(x))ﬁ
¡
i (xi) ¸ 0. (10)
This claim follows easily from the inequalities ﬁ
¡
i (xi)C(xi;0¡i) · sa„i(C;xi) ·
ﬁ
+
i (xi)C(xi;0¡i); we omit the straightforward details. By construction, we have
Lemma 2. Every method ’s;„ constructed as in (9) and (10) satis…es Solidarity. If
si(0) > 0 for all i 2 N, ’s;„ also satis…es Strict Solidarity.
Monotonicity imposes further restrictions on s;„: One of them is that each si is
nondecreasing (to see this, consider in (9) a function C such that C(xi;0¡i) = 0 for
all i). Necessary and su¢cient conditions seem di¢cult to formulate in a simple way;
in particular, the inequalities „i ¸ 0 are not implied. In the particular case where „i
is independent of both ti and xi, however, one checks that ’s;„ meets Monotonicity if
and only if si is nondecreasing and „i ¸ 0 for all i. Then the inequalities (10) reduce
to
P
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where 0 · ‚ · 1; and s : N ! R+: When s(xi) = 1 for all xi; this formula reduces to
(4) in Section 3.
Theorem 1*.
i) Assume n ¸ 4 and let ’ be a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Strict
Solidarity, and Monotonicity. For all i 2 N; there exists a nondecreasing function
si : N ! R++ and a real-valued function „i such that ’ = ’s;„; where ’s;„ is de…ned
in (9).
ii) Assume n ¸ 3 and let ’ be a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Sol-
idarity, Monotonicity, Zero Cost for Zero Demand, and Positive Cost for Positive
Demand. For all i 2 N there exists a nondecreasing function si : N ! R+ with
si(0) = 0 < si(1); and a real-valued function „i such that ’ = ’s;„.
Proof of Theorem 1*, statement i)
We …x throughout the proof a method ’ meeting Additivity, Strict Solidarity, and
Monotonicity. Recall that D is the subset of cost functions D such that D(z) = 0;1:
Writing @D = fz 2 D j z¡ei = 2 D for all i 2 N(z)g; Independence of Irrelevant Costs
yields ’(D;x) = ’(D0;x) whenever D;D0 2 D and x 2 @D \@D0: We may therefore
de…ne ￿ : NN ! ¢ by
￿(x) = ’(D;x);
where D is any cost function in D such that x 2 @D:
We spend Steps 1 to 5 computing ’(D;x) for D 2 D. After the preliminary
Steps 1 to 3, we construct the desired functions si; i = 1;::n; and derive the quasi-
proportional form ￿i(x) = Fi(x) in Step 4. Step 5 computes ’(D;x) for any D;x:
Using Additivity, Step 6 then derives ’(C;x) for all C 2 C:
Weuse the followingnotation. IfD 2 D andx 2 NN; ti(D;x¡i) = inf fxij(xi;x¡i) 2




i2S yi = 1g:
Step 1. We show that if D 2 D; x 2 D and there exist two distinct agents
i;j 2 N such that ti(D;x¡i) > 0 and tj(D;x¡j) > 0, then ’(D;x) À 0: It follows
that for any x 2 NN, fn(x) ¸ 2g ) f￿(x) À 0g:
To prove the …rst statement, assume its premises and consider the increase in i’s
demandfrom0 toxi: By Strict Solidarity, ’¡i(D;x)¡’¡i(D;(x¡i;0i))iseither strictly
positiveorzero. Inthe lattercase, ’(D;x) = ei; andinthe former case’¡i(D;x) À 0:
Repeating this argument withagentj; either ’(D;x) = ej or ’¡j(D;x) À 0: The only
possibility is therefore that ’¡i(D;x) À 0 and ’¡j(D;x) À 0; hence ’(D;x) À 0:
The second statement follows from the …rst because ti(D;x¡i) = xi for all i whenever
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Step 2. We show that for any D 2 D; i 2 N; x 2 D such that x¡i 6= 0; and
x0 = (x0
i;x¡i) such that x0
i > xi;
’¡i(D;x
0) ¡ ’¡i(D;x) = ¡‚￿¡i(x
0) for some ‚ ¸ 0: (11)
Monotonicityimplies ’i(D;x0)¡’i(D;x) ¸ 0, whereas
P
N (’j(D;x0)¡’j(D;x)) =
0 by budget balance. Thus, by Solidarity,
’j(D;x0)¡ ’j(D;x) · 0 for all j 6= i: (12)
Choose D0 2 D such that x0 2 @D0 and let ﬁ 2 R++: Applying Strict Solidarity
to ﬁD + D0 when xi increases to x0
i; we obtain that signfﬁ(’j(D;x0)¡ ’j(D;x)) +
(’j(D0;x0)¡’j(D0;x))g is independent of j;j 6= i; where sign(u) is 1;0; or ¡1 if u is
respectivelypositive, zeroornegative. From Step 1, ’j(D0;x0)¡’j(D0;x) = ￿j(x0) > 0
because n(x0) ¸ 2: On the other hand ’j(D;x0) ¡ ’j(D;x) = uj · 0: By Strict
Solidarity, u¡i ¿ 0 or u¡i = 0: In the latter case, (11) holds with ‚ = 0: In the
former, the vector ﬁu¡i + ￿¡i(x0) is either strictly positive, zero, or strictly negative.
Since this holds for all ﬁ > 0; u¡i and ￿¡i(x0) are parallel and of opposite sign, and
(11) holds with ‚ > 0.
Step 3. Weshowthat for any twodistinct i;j 2 N and any x¡ij 6= 0; thedirection
of ￿¡ij(yij;x¡ij) is independent of yij 2 N2nf0g: That is, there exists ‰(x¡ij) 2
¢(Nnij) such that, for all yij 2 N2nf0g; ￿¡ij(yij;x¡ij) = ‚‰(x¡ij) for some ‚ > 0:
Take i = 1; j = 2; …x x¡12 6= 0; and write ￿¡12(y12;x¡12) = s(y) 2 R
Nn12
+ ; where
y = (y1;y2) 2 N2nf0g: From now on, we do not repeat the restriction y 6= 0: By Step
1, s(y) À 0:
Pick y;y0 non-comparable (i.e., neither y · y0 nor y0 · y holds) and D such that
@D contains y and y0: Applying (11) twice, respectively to the increase from y to
y _y0, and from y0 to y_ y0;
’¡12(D;y_ y







Taking the di¤erence of these equalities,
s(y)¡ s(y0) = „s(y _y0) for some „ 2 R: (13)
This property holds for any non-comparable y;y0:
Recall that our goal is to show that the direction of s(y) is independent of y. To
this end, assume …rst that there exist y;y0 with y2 = y0
2 > 0; y1 < y0
1 and s(y) 6= s(y0):On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 24
Construct z;z0 such that z1 = z0
1 > y0
1 and z2 < z0
2 = y0
2 (see Figure 1). Two
applications of (13) give





Taking di¤erences we …nd that s(z0) and s(y)¡s(y0) have the same direction ‰;‰ À 0:
Let L be the straight line borne by ‰ and containing s(y): It contains s(z) and s(y0):
Now consider w;w0 such that w1 = w0
1 > z0
1 and w2 < w0
2 = z0
2 (see Figure 1). By
the above argument, s(w0) is borne by ‰; and L contains s(w): Applying (13) to z0;w
gives
s(z
0) ¡ s(w) = „s(w
0):
Thus s(z0) 2 L; implying that L is the line borne by ‰ through 0. Now s is the
direction of s(t) for the six points t of our construction.
We check next that s(t) is borne by ‰ for any t such that t2 · y2 (and t 6= 0):
We just proved this under the assumption that t1 > y0
1: Next suppose t1 · y0
1 and
0 < t2 · y2: Set z0 = (y0
1 + 1;0) and t0 = t _ z0 (see Figure 2). By (13) applied to
t;z0, s(t) is borne by ‰: The remaining values of t are t = (t1;0) with 0 < t1 · y0
1:
There we apply (13) to t and t0 = (t1 ¡ 1;1):
Summing up, we have shown that if s is not constant on a given horizontal line
fy j y2 = " > 0g; then the direction of s(y) is constant on the whole band fy j y2 · ";
y 6= 0g: If there are such integers " as large as we want, this establishes the desired
statement at once. The remaining case is when there is a number " such that s is
constant on every line fy j y2 = "0g; "0 ¸ ": For any y such that y1 > 0; apply (13)
to y and y0 = (y1 ¡1;"0) where "0 ¸ maxfy2 +1;"g : we deduce that s(y) is borne by
the value of s on fy j y2 = "0g: The remaining case y1 = 0 is handled similarly.
Step 4. We show that there exist n functions si : N ! R++ such that, for all
x 2 NN; fn(x) ¸ 2g ) f￿(x) = F(x)g:
We begin by considering the demand pro…les x such that n(x) = n: In particular,
￿(x) À 0: By Step3, the ratio
￿i
￿j(x) is independent of xk for all k 6= i;j (recall n ¸ 4):
For i;j;k all distinct,
￿i
￿j
(x) = sij(xi;xj) ) sij(xi;xj)sjk(xj;xk)ski(xk;xi) = 1:





sj(xj) for all i;j; all x: Thus the desired form ￿(x) = F(x)
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Next we treat the case n(x) = n¡1; de…ning si(0) in the process. Consider some










where the …rst equality follows from Step 3. By Step 3 again, ￿1
￿2(x) does not depend
















for all i;j 6= 1 and all x¡1 À 0:
Thus si
gi depends neither on i nor on xi: Calling this ratio s1(0) we now have ￿i
￿j(x) =
si(xi)
sj(xj) for all i;j. A similar construction delivers si(0) for all i, and proves ￿(x) = F(x)
when n(x) = n ¡ 1:
We complete the argument by decreasing induction on n(x): Fix q; 2 · q · n¡2:
Assume￿(x) = F(x) whenevern(x) ¸ q+1 andconsider xwith n(x) = q; say N(x) =










Note that q ¸ 2 ensures x¡i;j 6= 0; as required to apply Step 3. Moreover, q · n ¡2
guarantees that we have at least two choices for agent 1 in N(x); ditto for agent n in
NnN(x): The equality ￿(x) = F(x) is now clear.
Step 5. We derive an explicit formula for ’(D;x) for all D 2 D and x 2 D.
Using the notation ¿i(D) = ti(D;0¡i); note that xiei 2 D , ¿i(D) · xi and de…ne
K(D;x) = fi 2 N j ¿i(D) · xig: De…ne H : RN







(bi ¡ bj)aj): (14)
We show that there exist n functions ‚i such that, for all D 2 D and x 2 D,
’(D;x) = H(a;b); where for all i, (15)
ai = si(xi);
bi = ‚i(xi;¿i(D)) if i 2 K(D;x);
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In Step 5.a, we prove (15) when K(D;x) = ?: In Step 5.b, we construct the
functions ‚i and prove (15) when jK(D;x)j = 1. Step 5.c completes the proof by an
induction argument on jK(D;x)j.
Two simple facts about H will be useful. First
P











= bi ¡bj for all i;j such that ai;aj 6= 0g (16)
) fz = H(a;b)g:
We will use the notation x¡i = (0i;x¡i;):
Step 5.a. When K(D;x) = ?; (15) reduces to ’(D;x) = F(x): We prove this
equality by induction on n(x):
The smallest possible size is n(x) = 2 : if x = x1e1; say, then x 2 D forces
¿1(D) · x1: So we …x x with N(x) = f1;2g: De…ne x¤ = x+ e3 and choose D¤ such
that
D
¤ \[0;x] = D \[0;x] and x
¡i
¤ 2 @D
¤ for i = 1;2:
This is possible because x¡1
¤ ¡ e3 = x¡1 = x2e2 = 2 D and similarly x¡2
¤ ¡ e3 = 2 D:
By construction of D¤ and Step 4, ’(D¤;x¡1
¤ ) = ￿(x¡1
¤ ) = F(x¡1
¤ ): Applying (11)





¤ ) = ¡‚F¡1(x¤) ) ’¡1(D
¤;x¤) = „F¡1(x¤):
This, the symmetric property upon exchanging 1 and 2, and the fact that F(x¤) À 0,
give …nally ’(D¤;x¤) = F(x¤):
Next we apply (11) to D¤; x¤ and x¡3
¤ = x :
’¡3(D
¤;x¤) ¡ ’¡3(D
¤;x) = ¡‚F¡3(x¤) = ¡‚
0F¡3(x):
IndependenceofIrrelevantCosts implies’(D¤;x) = ’(D;x); soweconclude ’¡3(D;x)
= „F¡3(x) for some „ ¸ 0: Repeating this construction with coordinate 4 instead of
3 yields ’¡4(D;x) = ”F¡4(x) for some ” ¸ 0. The conclusion ’(D;x) = F(x) follows
as in the previous paragraph.
Now the inductionargument. Fix D;xsuchthat K(D;x) = ?: Suppose ti(D;x¡i)
= 0 , x¡i 2 D for at least two agents, say i = 1;2: Because K(D;x¡i) = ? for i =
1;2; the inductive assumption yields ’(D;x¡i) = F(x¡i) and, by (11), ’¡i(D;x) =
‚F¡i(x) for i = 1;2: This implies ’(D;x) = F(x) as above.
If ti(D;x¡i) = 0 for at most one i; then we can assume tj(D;x¡j) > 0 for j = 1;2:
We now construct x¤ = x + e3 and D¤ exactly as above. This is possible becauseOn Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 27
t1(D;x¡1) > 0 means x¡1 = 2 D; therefore x¡1
¤ ¡ e3 = 2 D; and similarly x¡2
¤ ¡ e3 = 2 D:
The same argument ends the proof.
Step 5.b. We prove (15) when jK(D;x)j = 1:
In this and the next substep, we use one more piece of notation: given z;z0 2 RN;
a 2 RN

















We start by choosing x with n(x) = 3; say, N(x) = f1;2;3g and D such that
K(D;x) = f1g and x¡1 2 D: We have drawn on Figure 3 the traces of D on the three
coordinate hyperplanes. We write z = ’(D;x) and zi = ’(D;x¡i); ai = si(xi) for all
i:
Applying (11) to x;x¡1 gives z¡1 ¡ z1






for all i;j 6= 1: (17)
Similarly, (11) applied to x;x¡2 and x;x¡3 gives
z »a
ij z2 for all i;j 6= 2; (18)
z »a
ij z3 for all i;j 6= 3: (19)





























By Independence of Irrelevant Costs, z2 = ’(D;x¡2) only depends upon x¡2 and
the trace of D on [0;x¡2]: Similarly z3 depends only upon x¡3 and the trace of D on
[0;x¡3]: Thus the common quantity in (20) only depends on x1 and the trace of D on
[0;x1e1]; namely ¿1(D): We write this quantity as ‚1(x1;¿1(D)) or ‚1 for simplicity
in the rest of this step.






= ‚1 for all i 6= 1;
and by (16),
z = H(a;(‚1;0¡1));
which is precisely (15) for (D;x):On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 28
Next we derive a similar formula for z2 and for w1 = ’(D;x1e1): Applying (11)





1 for all i;j 6= 3; with a
2
2 = s2(0); a
2
i = ai; i 6= 2: (21)
Combining (21) and (18), and the fact that »a
ij is an equivalence relation, we get for



















where ai = si(0): Now w1 only depends on x1 and ¿1(D); as does ‚1: If we repeat
the construction of Step 5.b while exchanging the roles of 2 and 4, i.e., for x0 such









Combining these properties of w1, including a similar equality where 3 replaces 2,
and (16), we conclude
w1 = H(a1;(‚1;0¡1));
where a1
1 = s1(x1) and a1
i = si(0) for i ¸ 2 : this is precisely (15) for (D; x1e1): As
’(D; x1e1) only depends on x1 and ¿1(D); this establishes (15) for any (D;x) where
n(x) = 1:
















= ‚1 for all i ¸ 3:
Thus (16) implies z2 = H(a2;(‚1;0¡1)): Again, ’(D;x¡2) only depends upon x¡2 and
the restriction of D to [0;x¡2]: Our choice of D in Step 5.b places no constraint on
the restriction of D to [0;x¡2]; except K(D;x¡2) = f1g: Therefore we have proven
(15) for any (D;x) where n(x) = 2 and jK(D;x)j = 1:
To complete the proof of (15) for any (D;x) such that n(x) = 3andjK(D;x)j = 1;
it only remains to take care of the case where x¡1 = 2 D (recall we assumed x¡1 2 D
instead at the beginning of Step 5.b). Consider such a con…guration illustrated in
Figure 3. We already know that z2 = ’(D;x¡2) and z3 = ’(D;x¡3) are given by
(15). Applying (11) to z = ’(D;x); z2 and to z; z3 delivers respectively the direction
of z¡2 and of z¡3; hence determines z by (16). We omit the details.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 29
To complete Step 5.b, it remains to establish formula (15) when jK(D;x)j = 1
and n(x) > 3: We proceed by induction on n(x): The argument is essentially the same
as above, once we observe that K(D;x) = f1g implies that for all i 6= 1; xiei = 2 D;
hence ti(D;x¡i) = 0:
Assume the desired conclusion holds whenever n(x) · t¡1 and let (D;x) be such
that K(D;x) = f1g and n(x) = q: Without loss of generality, assume N(x) contains
2;3. As before (see (21)) we de…ne a by ai = si(xi) for all i, and ai by ai
i = si(0) and
ai
j = aj for all j 6= i: Clearly K(D;x¡2) = f1g; so the inductive assumption gives
z2 = ’(D;x¡2) = H(a2;(‚1;0¡1)):














for all i ¸ 3:
The symmetrical argument involving z and z3 gives z1
a1 ¡ z2
a2 = ‚1 and the proof of
Step 5.b is complete.
Step 5.c. We prove (15) by induction on jK(D;x)j:
Fix k ¸ 2 and assume (15) holds whenever jK(D;x)j · k ¡ 1: Consider (D;x)
with jK(D;x)j = k; say, K(D;x) = f1;:::;kg: De…ne z = ’(D;x); zi = ’(D;x¡i); a;
and ai exactly as in Step 5.b. Clearly K(D;x¡i) = f1;:::;kgnfig for i · k, therefore
the inductive assumption implies
z
i = H(a
i;(b¡i;0i)) for i = 1;:::;k;
where b is de…ned by bj = ‚j(xj;¿j(D)) if j · k, and bj = 0 otherwise. Applying





















= b1 ¡ b2;
and (16) then yields z = H(a;b); as desired.
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De…ne „i; i 2 N; by
„i(xi;ti) = si(xi)‚i(xi;ti) if ti · xi;
0 otherwise.
Recalling our convention ¿i(D) = +1 if D does not intersect the i-axis, formula
(15) can be rewritten as follows. For all i; x; D such that x 2 D;




This formula coincides with (9) because (8) reduces to sa„i(D;xi) = „i(xi;¿i(D))
when D 2 D: An additive method is entirely determined by its behavior on such pairs
(D;x); thus the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 1*, statement ii)
We …x throughout anadditive method’ meetingthefouraxiomsinthestatement,
denoted for brevity SOL, MON, ZCZD and PCPD. The structure of the proof , and
the numbering of the corresponding steps and substeps, are identical to those of the
proof of statement i): we compute ￿(x) …rst, thus constructing F, then ’(D;x) by
constructing „ Some of the steps are considerably shorter, however.
Step 1. ZCZD and PCPD imply at once for all x;D;
x 2 D ) f’i(D;x) > 0 , i 2 N(x)g
and in particular ￿i(x) > 0 , xi > 0:
Step 2. We show here a stronger property than (11), namely for all x;D;i such
that xi > 0 and x¡i 6= 0;
x¡i 2 D ) ’¡i(D;x)¡ ’¡i(D;x¡i) = ¡‚￿¡i(x) for some ‚ > 0; (22)
x¡i = 2 D ) ’¡i(D;x) = ‚￿¡i(x) for some ‚ > 0: (23)
Note that by taking the di¤erence of (22) for xi and x0
i, we get (11).





Nni’j(D;x¡i). By SOL, ’j(D;x) ¸ ’j(D;x¡i) for each
j 2 Nni. Now suppose that for some j;k 2 N(x)ni we have ’j(x) < ’j(x¡i) whereas
’k(x) = ’k(x¡i). Pick D0 containing x but not x0 and apply SOL to ﬁD+D0 between
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fﬁ(’j(D;x) ¡ ’j(D;x¡i)) + ’j(D0;x)g’k(D0;x) ¸ 0;
which contradicts PCPD for ﬁ large enough. Thus ’j(D;x)¡ ’j(D;x¡i) < 0 , j 2






implying ’¡i(D;x)¡ ’¡i(D;x¡i) = ¡”’¡i(D0;x) for some ” > 0: If we choose D0 so
that x 2 @D0 we get (22), and (23) follows.
Step 3. The direction of the vector ￿¡i(x) is independent of xi 2 Nnf0g, when
x¡i 6= 0:
Indeed, pick xi;x0
i such that 0 < xi < x0
i; and D such that (xi;x¡i) 2 @D: By
(23), ’¡i(D;(x0
i;x¡i)) = ‚￿¡i((x0
i;x¡i)) for some ‚ > 0 and by (11) ’¡i(D;(x0
i;x¡i))
¡ ’¡i(D;(xi;x¡i)) = ’¡i(D;(x0
i;x¡i)) ¡ ￿¡i((xi;x¡i)) = ¡„￿¡i(x) for some „ ¸ 0:
Step 4. We construct the nondecreasing functions si such that si(0) = 0 < si(1)
and ￿(x) = F(x) for all x such that n(x) ¸ 3:
Setting N0 = N(x) and ￿0(x) to be the projection of ￿(x) on RN0; we note that
￿0(x) is strictly positive and in ¢(N0). By Step 3, ￿0i
￿0j depends on xi;xj only, and a
standard argument gives then the functions si on Nnf0g such that ￿0(x) = F(x) for
all x such that N(x) = N0: The argument is essentially the same as in Step 4 of the
previous proof, except that we only need N0 to contain 3 or more agents. This is why
we only need to assume n ¸ 3 in statement ii) of Theorem 1*.
In view of Step1, it is now routine to show that the functions si do not depend on
N0; and to extend the equality ￿(x) = F(x) to all coordinates by setting si(0) = 0:
Step 5. We show, as in the previous proof, the existence of functions ‚i allowing
the representation of ’(D;x) by (15).
Step 5.a. For any (D;x) with x 2 D and K(D;x) = ?; ’(D;x) = F(x):
Prove this …rst for x such that N(x) = f1;2g: Set x¤ = x + e3; pick D¤ such
that D¤ = D on [0;x] and x¡1
¤ ; x¡2
¤ = 2 D¤: By (23) ’¡i(D¤;x¤) is borne by F¡i(x¤)
for i = 1;2: In view of Step 4 this implies ’(D¤;x¤) = F(x¤): Invoke next (22):







where the latter equality follows from Independence of Irrelevant Costs.
The ascending induction on n(x) is now immediate by (22) and Step 1.
Step 5.b. We assume now jK(D;x)j = 1; and of course x 2 D: If n(x) = 1
there is nothing to prove (by ZCZD), contrary to the previous proof. If n(x) = 2; we
simply copy Step 5.b to de…ne the functions ‚i and compute z;z2;z3: By Step 1 weOn Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 32
need not worry about whether or not x¡1 2 D: The ascending induction on n(x) is
unchanged.
Step 5.c. The ascending induction on jK(D;x)j is unchanged.
Step 6. is unchanged.
8.3. Proof of Theorem 1. The “if” part of statements i) and ii) is clear. To
prove the “only if” part in either statement, we assume that a method given by (9)
satis…es Strong Ranking, and prove that „i, hence sa„i is identically zero for all i.
We check …rst si = sj for all i;j: Pick x = teN;t ¸ 1; and C;C(z) = 1 if
n(z) ¸ 2;C(z) = 0 otherwise. Then ’(C;x) = F(x), so Strong Ranking implies
si(t) = sj(t) for t ¸ 1: Under Zero Cost for Zero Demand, this is enough. On the
other hand if n ¸ 4; we choose x0 = teNnf1;2g and the same cost function C to get
s1(0) = s2(0); and we are done.
Assume now there is an agent i and x1;t1 such that „1(x1;t1) 6= 0: Choose C =
–
(t1;0¡1) as in (28) so that sa„i(C;xi) = 0 for i ¸ 2; sa„1(C;x1) = „1(x1;t1): Then for
i ¸ 2;






(1¡ „1) = ’i(C;x1eN);
contradicting Strong Ranking.
8.4. Proof of Theorem 2. Step 1. i) implies ii) and iii). Let ’ be a …xed-‡ow
method. It is easy to check that ’ satis…es Additivity, Separability and Monotonicity;
we prove here that it also meets Submodular Solidarity and Supermodular Solidarity.
Let f(:;x) be the …xed-‡ow associated with ’ and write f(:;x) = pxf(:;x) for all
x 2 [0;x]: Observe that pxf(:;x + ei) = f(:;x) for all i; all x 2 [x ¡ ei]: We …x i;j;
i 6= j; x 2 [x¡ ei]; and z 2 [x¡ ej]:
First we compare fj(z;x) and fj(z;x + ei): If zi < xi; then K contains neither
i nor j, hence (x + ei)K = xK, implying fj(z;x) = fj(z;x + ei): If zi = xi; then
K contains i but not j; hence [xK;(x + ei)K] = fxK;xK + ei
Kg so that fj(z;x) =
















(@jC(z + ei) ¡@jC(z))fj(z + ei;x+ ei);On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 33
implying Submodular Solidarity and Supermodular Solidarity at once.
Step 2. ii) implies i). Fix a method ’ satisfying Additivity, Separability, Mono-
tonicity, and Submodular Solidarity: Let f be its ‡ow representation as in (5). We
show f(:;x) = pxf(:;x) for any x 2 [0;x].
Step 2.a. For all i 2 N; x 2 [0;x¡ ei]; and z 2 [0;x¡ ei];
fi(z;x) = fi(z;x+ e
i): (24)
This is a well-known consequence of Monotonicity: see Moulin (1995) or Sprumont
(2000) for a proof. Equation (24) does not imply the property fj(z;x) = fj(z;x+ei)
for j 6= i (except when n = 2, where it follows from ‡ow conservation); that property
is derived in the next step using Submodular Solidarity.
Step 2.b. For all i 2 N; x 2 [0;x¡ ei]; and z 2 [0;x¡ ei];
f(z;x) = f(z;x+ e
i): (25)
The proof of (25) is by induction on z(N); the sum of the coordinates of z: Let
z = 0: By Step 2.a, fi(0;x) = fi(0;x + ei): If (25) fails, as total out‡ow from 0 is 1
under f(:;x) and f(:;x +ei); there exist j;k 2 Nni such that fj(0;x) < fj(0;x +ei)
and fk(0;x) > fk(0;x+ ei): Consider the cost function
–0(w) = 0 if w = 0;
1 otherwise.
Note that –0 2 Csub: But ’j(–0;x) = fj(0;x) < fj(0;x + ei) = ’j(–0;x + ei) and
’k(–0;x) = fk(0;x) > fk(0;x + ei) = ’k(–0;x + ei); contradicting Submodular Soli-
darity.
Next, …x k > 0 and assume that (25) is true for all z 2 [0;x ¡ ei[ such that
z(N) · k ¡ 1: Fix z 2 [0;x ¡ ei[ such that z(N) = k: By the induction hypothesis
fj(z ¡ ej;x) = fj(z ¡ ej;x + ei) for all j 2 N such that zj > 0, hence the total














j2Nnifj (z; x +ei): If
zj < xj for at most one j 2 Nni; we are done. Otherwise suppose, by contradiction,
that f(z;x) 6= f(z;x + ei) : there exist j;k 2 Nni such that fj(z;x) < fj(z;x + ei)
and fk(z;x) > fk(z;x +ei). Consider the cost function
–z(w) = 0 if w · z; (26)
1 otherwise.On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 34









i)¡ fj(z;x) > 0
and, symmetrically, ’k(–z;x + ei)¡ ’k(–z;x) = fk(z;x + ei) ¡ fk(z;x) < 0; contra-
dicting Submodular Solidarity.
Step 2.c. For all i 2 N, x 2 [0;x¡ ei]; and z 2 [0;x[;
f(z;x) = pxf(z;x +e
i): (27)
Since px0pxf(:;x) = px0f(:;x) for x0 · x · x; this will complete the proof of Step 2.
By Step 2.b, (27) is true for z 2 [0;x ¡ ei[ as for such a z we have i = 2 K and
xK = (x + ei)K: It remains to extend it to all z 2 [xiei;x[: Consider …rst z = xiei
and suppose, by way of contradiction, that f(xiei;x) 6= pxf(xiei;x+ ei) : there exist
j;k 2 Nni such that fj(xiei;x) > fj(xiei;x+ei)+fj((xi+1)ei;x+ei) and fk(xiei;x) <
fk(xiei;x + ei) + fk((xi + 1)ei;x + ei): Recalling Step 2.b, this yields a violation of
Submodular Solidarity for the cost function –(xi+1)ei. Thus f(z;x) = pxf(z;x + ei)
for z = xiei: An induction argument mimicking that in Step 2.b completes Step 2.c,
and the proof that ’ is a …xed-‡ow method.
Step 3. iii) impliesi). The argument inStep2 is easily adapted. The submodular
cost functions –z are merely replaced with the supermodular functions –z de…ned by
–
z(w) = 1 if w ¸ z; (28)
0 otherwise,
and the induction argument is carried on x(N)¡ z(N) rather than on z(N):
8.5. Proof of Proposition 5. Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 2 shows that the
…xed-‡ow methods meet Positive Externalities and Negative Externalities.
Next, we show that the Aumann-Shapley method (Example 1) also does. To
shorten notation, we denote ’ the Aumann-Shapley method, and f its ‡owrepresen-
tation. Fix a demand pro…le x, two arbitrary agents 1 and 2, and z¡1 2 [0¡1;x¡1[:
For z1 = 0;:::;x1 + 1; we write f(z1;x) instead of f((z1;z¡1);x) and f(z1;x + e1)






f2(z1;x+ e1) (29)On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 35







The claim implies that the sequence (f2(z1;x);z1 = 0;::;x1), augmented by 0 as the
last term, stochastically dominates (f2(z1;x + e1);z1 = 0;::;x1 + 1): Using (5),this
implies ’2(C;x) ¸ ’2(C;x+ e1) if C is submodular and the reverse weak inequality
holds if C is supermodular.
Equation(29)follows immediately from thefactthattheAumann-Shapley method
satis…es Strong Dummy (see comment 2 after Theorem 2). We omit the easy proof.
To prove (30), recall the notation and formula in Example 1 and de…ne ﬂk =
ﬁ((k;z¡1)); ￿k = ﬁ(x¡(k;z¡1)¡ e2) for k = 0;:::;x1¡ 1; and ￿¡1 = ﬁ(x¡ (0;z¡1)+
















(x1 ¡ t+ 1)
k Q
t=1
(x(N) ¡ z(Nn1)¡ t)
￿0:




















a1:::akx1:::(x1 ¡ k + 2)
k!b1:::bk¡1
:
Using x(N) + 1 = a1 + b0; subtract
b0
x1+1 from both sides of this inequality and




















a2:::akx1:::(x1 ¡ k + 2)
k!b1:::bk¡1
:On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 36
Subtract 1




















a2:::ak(x1 ¡ 1):::(x1 ¡ k + 2)
2:::kb1:::bk¡1
;
in which a1 and b0 no longer appear.





















a3:::ak(x1 ¡ 2):::(x1 ¡ k + 2)
3:::kb2:::bk¡1
;
where a2 and b1 no longer appear.

















Using x(N)+1 = ak +bk¡1; subtracting 1
x1+1 from both sides and multiplying by
bk¡1




k; which reduces to x(N) +1 ¸ bk.
8.6. Statement and proof of Lemma 3. We work out the restrictions imposed
by Strong Ranking and Weak Separability on formula (7). For any x 2 NN; let
¢(x) = fy 2 ¢ jfor all i;j 2 N; xi · xj ) yi · yjg: Write fxi j i 2 N(x)g =
f»1;:::;»Kg; where 0 < »1 < ::: < »K; and set »0 = 0: For k = 1;:::;K; let Nk =
fi 2 N j xi ¸ »kg. Using this notation, the extreme points of ¢(x) are the vectors
bk = 1
jNkjeNk; k = 1;:::;K: We sometimes write K(x) to emphasize that K depends
upon x:
Lemma 3. An additive cost-sharing method ’ satis…es Strong Ranking and Weak
Separability if and only if it possesses a shared-‡ow representation (f;r) such that,
for all x 2 NN; z 2 [0;x[; j 2 N; and k 2 f1;:::;K(x)g;
f»k¡1 · zj < »kg ) fr(z;j;x) = bkg: (31)On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 37
Proof. Step 1. We show that an additive cost-sharing method ’ satis…es Strong
Ranking if and only if it possesses a shared-‡ow representation (f;r) such that, for
all x 2 NN; z 2 [0;x[; and j 2 N; r(z;j;x) 2 ¢(x):
The “if” statement is clear from the representation in (7). Conversely, assume ’
meets Additivity and Strong Ranking, and …x x 2 NN such that x1 · ::: · xn: De…ne
the linear isomorphism h : RN ! RN by
h(y) = (ny1;(n ¡ 1)(y2 ¡ y1);:::;2(yn¡1¡ yn¡2);yn ¡ yn¡1)
and observe that it maps ¢(x) into a face -(x) of ¢: For instance, if x1;:::;xn are all
distinct, h is an isomorphism from ¢(x) into ¢; if N = f1;2;3;4;5g and x1 = x2 <
x3 < x4 = x5; then -(x) is the face y2 = y5 = 0:
De…ne ˆ(C;x) = h(’(C;x)) for all C 2 C. By Strong Ranking, ’(C;x) is borne
by a vector in ¢(x); hence ˆ(C;x) ¸ 0: Therefore ˆ(:;x) is a bona …de additive







for all C 2 C.
If yi = 0 for all y 2 -(x); then ˆi(C;x) = 0 for all C 2 C, implying that
ri(z;j;x) = 0 for all z 2 [0;x[ and j 2 N: Thus r(z;j;x) 2 -(x) for all z and j:








for all C 2 C. Since h¡1(r(z;j;x)) 2 ¢(x); we are done.
Step 2. We complete the proof. Let ’ be a cost-sharing method satisfying
Additivity, Strong Ranking, and Weak Separability, and …x x 2 NN. For a 2 Nnf0g
and i 2 N; consider the function –
aei
de…ned in (28): –
aei
(z) = 1 if zi ¸ a and
–
aei




;x) = efi2Njxi¸ag for all
a 2 Nnf0g: Equivalently,





;x) = eNk: (33)
By Strong Ranking ’(–
aei
;x) 2 ¢(x) for all i. By (33) and the fact that bk is an
extreme point of ¢(x); ’(–
aei
;x) = bk whenever »k¡1 < a · »k and i 2 Nk: If ’




z:zi=a¡1fi(z;x)r(z;i;x), therefore the sameOn Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 38
extremality argument yields r(z;i;x) = bk for all z 2 [0;x[ such that zi = a ¡ 1 and
fi(z;x) > 0: Note that zi varies from »k¡1 to »k ¡ 1: If fi(z;x) = 0; the choice of
r(z;i;x) is irrelevant and we may set r(z;i;x) = bk in that case too. This proves the
“only if” part of the lemma. The proof of the converse statement is similar because
every symmetricseparable costfunctionC(z) =
P
i2N c(zi) may be writtenas a linear
combination of cost functions –
aei
:
It is interestingto compare theshared-‡owrepresentationinLemma3 withthat of
separable methods given in formula (5) in Section 4. In both cases the share system r
in the general formula (7) is entirely determined and the ‡owf is arbitrary. Thus the
two families of methods -separable onone hand, weakly separable andmeeting Strong
Ranking on the other hand- are comparably rich. In the former case, however, every
‡ow f yields a di¤erent method, whereas in the latter case di¤erent ‡ows may lead
to the same method. Consider for instance the cross-subsidizing serial method ’cs
(Example5) and…x x 2 NN
¤ : Every ‡ow f(:;x) that goes entirely throughx1;x2;::;xn,
together with the sharing rule r(:;:;x) de…ned by formula (31), determines a valid
representation of ’cs(:;x).
8.7. Proof of Proposition 7. Assume n ¸ 3 and let ’ be a cost-sharing method
satisfying all four stated axioms. By Lemma 3, ’ has a shared-‡ow representation
(f;r) such that for all x 2 NN; z 2 [0;x[; j 2 N; and k 2 f1;:::;K(x)g; equation
(31) holds. In particular, this implies Zero Cost for Zero Demand because xi = 0
implies bk
i = 0 for all k = 1;:::;K(x). As a consequence, any contradiction derived
for n = 3 extends to more agents by considering demand pro…les where all agents but
three demand zero.
Fix thus n = 3 and let x be such that 2 · x1 < x2 < x3: Write f for f(:;x): As
already noted in the proof of Proposition 1, Strong Group Monotonicity is equivalent
to the property that for all D 2 D, all distinct agents i;j 2 N; and all x 2 NN;
D(x) = 1 ) ’j(D;x+ ei) · ’j(D;x): (34)
In the following argument, we write D_D0 for the supremum of two cost functions





z is the cost function de…ned in (28). By (31) and Independence of Irrelevant
Costs, ’(D;(e x1;x2;x3)) = e3 because D coincides with –
(0;0;x3) on [0;(e x1;x2;x3)]. By
(34), ’2(D;x) · ’2(D;(e x1;x2;x3)); hence ’2(D;x) = 0: By (31) again, this gives
f1(z ¡ e1) = 0 for all z such that z1 = e x1 + 1 and z3 < x3: Since this is true for all
e x1 2 [0;x1[; the entire ‡ow must be contained in A = fz 2 [0;x[j z1 = 0 or z3 = x3g,
that is to say fi(z) > 0 requires z3 = x3 or z3 < x3;z1 = 0; and i 6= 1:On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing 39
Next choose x0





Now D coincides with –(0;x2;x3¡1) on [0;x¡ e3]; (31) and Independence of Irrelevant
Costs imply that ’(D;x¡e3) is a convex combination of e3 and
1
2e23; hence ’1(D;x¡
e3) = 0: By (34), ’1(D;x) = 0: This implies that f2(z ¡ e2) = 0 for all z such that
0 · z1 · x1; 1 · z2 · x1; and z3 = x3.
Next pick x0





As D coincides with –
(x1;x1;x3) on [0;(x1;x0
2;x3)]; (31), Independence of Irrelevant
Costs and the fact that f(:;(x1;x0
2;x3)) is contained in A together imply that ’(D;
The cross-subsidizing serial method occupies a central position among the methods
described by Lemma 2: see our companion papers Moulin and Sprumont (2002),
(2003) for two characterizations of it, based respectively on Distributivity and Coor-
dinality.(x1;x0
2;x3)) = 1
3e123: Now (34) yields ’3(D;x) · 1
3 By Strong Ranking, this
forces ’(D;x) = 1
3e123. Thus f2(z ¡ e2) = 0 for all z such that 0 · z1 · x1 ¡ 1;
x1 + 1 · z2 · x2; and z3 = x3: Moreover, f3(z ¡ e3) = 0 for all z such that z1 = 0;
x1 +1 · z2 · x2; and z3 = x3:
Gathering our results, we conclude that i) the entire ‡ow must go through the
edge between (0;x1;x3 ¡ 1) and (0;x1;x3); i.e., f3(0;x1;x3 ¡ 1) = 1; and ii) within





By the shape of the ‡ow f(:;x¡ e1) and (31), ’(D;x¡ e1) = 1
3e123: By the shape of
f(:;x) and (31), ’(D;x) = e3; a contradiction to Monotonicity.